

Top Secret 217

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
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Thursday March 10, 1977 CG NIDC 77-056C

State Dept. review completed



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, March 10, 1977.

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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CHINA-US-USSR: Human Rights

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[] //The Chinese have welcomed President Carter's criticism of the USSR on human rights, treating it as evidence of growing rivalry between the US and the USSR.//

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[] Chinese media have treated the human rights controversy as evidence that detente between Washington and Moscow is "non-existent" and that "superpower rivalry" has intensified. These accounts lay the blame for the dispute at Moscow's doorstep, charging that it resulted from Moscow's "intensified repression" of Soviet dissidents.

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[] //The Chinese have also been concerned since the election that the Carter administration would not deal firmly with the Soviets. Although this concern has focused mainly on strategic issues such as SALT, the Chinese seem to be interpreting the US attitude on the rights issue as one sign of a toughening attitude toward Moscow.//

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[] The Chinese regime gave back-handed approval to the US decision to retaliate when the Soviets--in a rights-related move--expelled a US newsman from Moscow last month. Chinese media said the US "showed no weakness" by ordering a Soviet news correspondent to leave the US.

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IRAQ-FRANCE: F-1 Aircraft Training

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[REDACTED] Iraqi pilots and mechanics have arrived in France for training on the Mirage F-1 aircraft, according to a French press report. Their arrival suggests that a contract for the sale of the F-1 either has been signed or is imminent.

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[REDACTED] Most of Iraq's military equipment, including aircraft, is of Soviet origin and weapons deliveries from the USSR continue. Iraq is also buying equipment from the West in an attempt to diversify its sources of supply. Except for a few British-built Hawker-Hunter aircraft, all of Iraq's fighters are Soviet-made.

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[REDACTED] //The F-1 will provide Iraq an interceptor generally superior to the Soviet-built MIG-23s already in the country.

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[REDACTED] The addition of F-1s to the Iraqi air force will significantly upgrade its capabilities. Although Iraqi pilots and technicians will probably need some time to master the French equipment, the training they receive should be of higher quality than that given by the Soviets. In addition, an agreement between France and Iraq for the F-1 most likely will include a logistical support arrangement superior to that normally provided by the Soviets.

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CHINA: Wheat Purchases

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[] China's purchase from Australia of 2 million tons of wheat, which was announced on Tuesday, raises the total amount of wheat scheduled for delivery this year to 5.1 million tons; this could cost China more than \$500 million. The pattern since 1975 had been of declining wheat imports.

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[] Thus far, 2.3 million tons have been purchased from Canada, 2.5 million tons from Australia, and 300,000 tons from Argentina. The Chinese also asked Canada to deliver wheat purchased in December as soon as possible and to begin deliveries on new contracts in February rather than March. The two countries plan to meet again this spring to discuss a possible long-term wheat import contract.


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[] China's grain output has only increased 2 to 3 percent since 1974. Early crops have been retarded by cool, damp, overcast weather, and planting of the more important fall-harvested crops has been delayed. Excess rain, wind, and frost have also reduced harvests. The Chinese are concerned and have accelerated their meteorological research.

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[] Total output of grain in 1976 probably was 280 million tons, about the same as in 1975. China's final, official assessment of the 1976 crop was that total grain set an all-time record and that most of the 29 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions exceeded or reached the 1975 level of grain production. Our analysis of provincial grain output claims indicates, however, that those claiming increases for the year did so on the strength of early-harvested grains, whereas the more important fall-harvested grains were down.

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[redacted] China probably will not make further grain purchases until late spring or summer when the outcome of this year's early harvest is known. Thus far, winter wheat--accounting for about 16 percent of national grain output--appears to be suffering from drought. Timely rains could rectify the problem, and additional imports may not be necessary. If the weather is bad, and buying resumes, China would likely purchase at least another 1 million tons from Canada before considering purchases from the US. [redacted]

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EC: Economic Summit

25X1 [] //The EC foreign ministers seem sharply divided over the question of Community representation at the economic summit. British Prime Minister Callaghan this week invited the leaders of France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and the US to London for a May 7-8 meeting on the subject.//

25X1 [] //According to EC officials, French Foreign Minister Guiringaud told his colleagues on Tuesday that only individual states should take part in the economic summit and that EC representation would not be appropriate. []

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25X1 [] //The smaller EC states are also vigorously opposed to the French position. They contend that it contradicts an understanding reached last June by the EC heads of government. Dutch Foreign Minister van der Stoep has publicly criticized the French, indicating that the Dutch will press hard on this issue when the EC heads of government meet in Rome later this month.//

25X1 [] //The British have been noncommittal on the subject, defending their decision not to include the EC on the list of summit participants on the grounds that no consensus on Community participation had yet been reached in Brussels. Foreign Secretary Owen told the press following this week's meeting that London would accept "whatever consensus might emerge with respect to Jenkins' participation."//

25X1 [] //The British may hope that Giscard will agree to a compromise which, while ruling out Jenkins' presence at the summit, would allow Callaghan to attend in a dual capacity, representing both the EC and the UK. The smaller EC states, however, would probably resist such an arrangement.//

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